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Learning about Education 
 
Limited human capital investment is a common characteristic of low-income countries despite 
the fact that estimated returns to educational investment in low-income countries are 
generally higher than in high-income countries. Empirical evidence suggests that income and 
credit constraints can only account for a small part of this underinvestment. Recent 
experimental evidence shows that families’ misperceptions about the returns to education 
play a large role in their low investment levels. This paper builds a model of human capital 
and growth that incorporates an adaptive learning mechanism to capture the way agents 
form perceptions about returns to education. In an economy where human capital 
investments have both private and public returns, we find multiple learnable equilibria, 
including those which are characterized by low investment and low returns. We also find that 
even when the rational equilibrium corresponds to a high level of human capital investment, 
the learning mechanism, influenced by the agents’ priors and cultural bias, may impart low 
human capital investment for extended periods. Policies that can speed up the learning 
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 1 Introduction
One of the persistent problems developing economies face is their inability to make
substantial progress in raising the average level of human capital. Low levels of human
capital investment persist despite the fact that human capital investments, through
education, have been shown to have high returns in low-income countries where hu-
man capital is relatively scarce. Typical explanations for the lack of optimal, or
even suﬃcient human capital investment on the part of low-income households usu-
ally begin with income and credit constraints. However, the failure of unconditional
cash transfers, microcredit and the lowering of school costs to increase educational
investments suggest that income and credit constraints provide an insuﬃcient ex-
planation. Low school quality is also an incomplete explanation as it fails to fully
reconcile the fact that returns to education are consistently estimated to be high even
in areas where school quality appears to be relatively low. The failure of low income
households to optimally invest in education, then, is one of the persistent puzzles in
development.
New research has begun to shed light on another factor that appears to have a dra-
matic impact and that might solve the puzzle: low-income families may not be aware
of the rate of return to investments in human capital (Jensen, 2010). Information
scarcity may, in fact, be one of the key hallmarks of poor households in low-income
countries. For example, other research has found that agricultural households fail
to use proﬁtable fertilizers, and that demonstrating their eﬀectiveness can increase
utilization rates (Duﬂo, et. al., 2004).
Uninformed actors have been found in other studies of diﬀerent types of economic
2decision making. Credit markets are one example where a number of studies have
found that individuals underestimate the costs of borrowing (e.g. Stango and Zinman,
2007). Other studies have found that workers are not well-informed of their pension
or social security beneﬁts (e.g. Chan and Stevens, 2008; Mitchell, 1988), or do a poor
job estimating the risk of smoking (Viscusi, 1990).
The fact that information can aﬀect behavior has been supported by a number of
diﬀerent studies. For example, Duﬂo and Saez (2003) ﬁnd that providing information
about retirement beneﬁts aﬀects decisions about retirement plans, and Dupas (2006)
ﬁnds that information on age and HIV infection rates can inﬂuence the risky sexual
behavior of Kenyan girls.
Human capital investment decisions are based on information identifying (or at
least shedding some light on) the potential returns to education; and if, for poor
households in low-income countries, this information is scarce, resisted, or is perceived
to be of poor quality, then understanding and modeling the process through which
households update their information – i.e. learn about education – is essential to
determining why certain outcomes, such as low human capital investment traps, arise.
Incorporating learning into theoretical models becomes all the more critical when the
economy includes complicated feedback, as is the case with human capital investment:
the actions of the households themselves aﬀect the very returns they are trying to
understand.1 Thus modeling the mechanism through which households learn about
the true returns to education is critically important to understanding the economic
development of a country.
1This self-reinforcing feedback dynamic is likely an accurate description of low-income countries,
which are known to have large social returns to education.
3This paper builds a dynamic model of household investment in human capital,
which exhibits both private and social returns. Under rationality, the model has mul-
tiple equilibria including those corresponding to high and low education outcomes.
We then modify the model by assuming agents are boundedly rational, and we incor-
porate a set of learning mechanisms to examine the process through which households
learn about the real returns to education. We ﬁnd that the low education rational
equilibrium may be stable under learning: if agents use our simple learning mecha-
nism then, under certain quite general conditions, the economy will converge (in a
natural, probabilistic sense) to the low human capital investment rational equilib-
rium. We ﬁnd further, that even if agents eventually learn to coordinate on a high
education outcome, the nature of the learning algorithm, as inﬂuenced by beliefs and
cultural norms, may prevent rapid convergence.
Our model and results are rich enough to allow for policy prescription. We ﬁnd
that associated to each stable rational equilibrium is a basin of attraction; this sug-
gests that public outreach or other similar programs designed to inﬂuence household
beliefs may improve welfare by placing these beliefs in the basin of attraction of a
pareto superior rational equilibrium. Analysis of this type of policy within the context
of our model conﬁrms this intuition.
Policy may also aﬀect how rapidly an economy converges to a rational equilibrium.
We identify a parameter of the learning algorithm which has two natural interpreta-
tions: “conﬁdence in information quality;” or “strength of prior beliefs.” We show
that by increasing conﬁdence, or analogously, weakening priors, the government can
increase the speed of convergence to the rational equilibrium and thereby mitigate the
tendency of cautious agents to systematically underestimate the value of education.
42 Background
Average levels of education in low-income countries remain well below those of high-
income countries despite large-scale educational expansion eﬀorts over the last few
decades. Barro and Lee (2001) estimated that the average years of education in
developing countries for 2000 was 4.9 years whereas in advanced countries the average
years of schooling was 9.8. They also ﬁnd that in developing countries only 19.7%
of the population over 25 have attained some secondary education and only 7.2%
have attained some tertiary education whereas in advanced countries the ﬁgures are
39.4% and 29.1% respectively. They also estimate that the gains in educational
attainment through time are no faster in low-income countries: from 1960 to 2000,
advanced countries and developing countries had similar growth trajectories in terms
of average years of schooling, in other words, low-income countries are not catching
up.
These low investment levels are in stark contrast to the relatively high returns to
education experienced in developing countries. In a meta-study of the received empir-
ical evidence, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) ﬁnd an average year of schooling
eﬀect on income of 10.9% for low-income countries as opposed to 7.4% for high-income
countries. Returns to investment in education are similarly divergent: private returns
to investment in secondary education in low-income countries are 19.9% whereas they
are 12.2% in high-income countries. The returns for higher education are 26% for low-
income countries and 12.4% for high-income countries.
Our model assumes both private and social returns to education - the beneﬁts to
individual educational investment that accrue to non-investors. Psacharopoulos and
5Patrinos (2004) show that many studies have found substantial social returns to edu-
cation in low-income countries: 21.3% for primary education, 15.7% for secondary and
11.2% for higher education, on average (though they sound a word of caution about
the reliablity of these estimates given the challenges involved). Hall and Jones (1999)
also ﬁnd signiﬁcant total factor productivity (TFP) and growth eﬀects from average
education levels as do de la Fuente and Domenech (2001). And while Acemoglu and
Angrist (2000) do not ﬁnd evidence of social returns from high school education in
the US, Moretti (2006) ﬁnds sizeable externalities associated with college education
in the US. Both of these ﬁndings are reinforced by Irazano and Peri (2009) who ﬁnd,
using US data, social returns from high school education in the zero to one percent
range but in the six to nine percent range for college education. Considering the low
average level of education in developing countries, estimates of positive social returns
to lower levels of educational attainment do not seem unreasonable.
Given the relatively low level of education in developing countries and the rela-
tively high returns, researchers have been left to puzzle over explanations for the lack
of investment in human capital. Explanations such as income and credit constraints,
high discount rates or simply errors of bias in the measurement of returns have been
explored but recent empirical research has left them wanting.2
If income and credit constraints are the explanation for the low investment levels
in education in low-income countries, easing them should yield substantial returns.
However, Banerjee, et. al., (2010) found evidence from a large experiment on mi-
2For example, there has been some concern over potential mis-measurement of the true returns to
education. However Duﬂo (2001) uses a policy experiment and ﬁnds an average return to a year of
schooling of 7.8% in Indonesia, and Emerson and Souza (2010) use instrumental variables techniques
and ﬁnd average returns to a year of education in Brazil to be 13.4%.
6crocredit in India that providing families with credit did not increase educational
investment or outcomes. The experience with unconditional cash transfer programs
also suggests that income and credit constraints are insuﬃcient to explain the human
capital gap, as de Janvry, et. al. (2006) state: “...unconditional transfers have small
eﬀects on school choices compared to conditional transfers where the condition for
the transfer is on school attendance.”
The question then arises: do families in low-income countries have complete in-
formation about the returns to human capital? Jensen (2010) ﬁnds that perceived
returns to education in the Dominican Republic are very low, especially relative re-
turns measured with earnings data. He then uses an experiment to study the eﬀect of
information about the true return to education on investment behavior. He ﬁnds that
relative to students not provided with information about returns, informed students
perceived dramatically increased returns. Such informed students were more likely
to be enrolled in school the next academic term, and when observed four years later,
those students had completed on average about 0.20 more years of schooling. He also
found some evidence suggesting that students rely heavily on the earnings of workers
in their own community when they formed their own expectations of earnings. There
is strong evidence then that perceptions about the return to investments in human
capital are both substantially low and a constraint on human capital investment in
low-income countries.
The link between human capital and growth is now well-established in the empir-
ical literature. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1989), Barro (1991), Benhabib and Spiegel
(1994), Barro (1997) and Hanushek and Kimko (2000) all ﬁnd evidence of a strong
causal relationship between a country’s human capital levels and its growth rates.
7Human capital and growth theory dates back to the endogenous growth literature
(see Aghion and Howitt (1997) for a good overview) and has been adapted to devel-
opment most notably by Azariadis and Drazen (1990) which incorporates a threshold
human capital externality in a model of economic growth.
Learning has a well-established place in the macroeconomics literature (see, e.g.
Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) but has not been widely adopted in growth models
despite the considerable evidence of incomplete information. There are now, however,
a handful of papers that incorporate learning in models of economic growth. Evans,
Honkapohja, and Romer (1998) use a simple learning algorithm in an endogenous
growth model with research and development to explain cycles between periods of high
and low growth. Arifovic, Bullard, Duﬀy (1997) use a genetic algorithms approach to
explain the transition from low to high growth. And perhaps the work most closely
related to ours is that of Steiger (2009): she adapts learning to the Azariadis and
Drazen (1990) framework and ﬁnds that while the low (in her case, zero) eduction
steady state is learnable, the high education steady state is not; interestingly, however,
she ﬁnds that complex stochastic dynamics may lead the economy away from the low
education steady state and induce endogenous ﬂuctuations.
3 Model
We begin by specifying a fairly general version of the model, and then, to focus atten-
tion on issues of equilibrium coordination, we develop our analysis within the context
of a highly stylized version. The common environment is a two-period, overlapping
generations model with agglomeration eﬀects. The general setting is one where young
8agents have to decide on their own human capital investment, but are uncertain of
the true returns. When old, true returns are realized but human capital is ﬁxed. Re-
turns are based on both individual human capital investment and on societal human
capital investment.
We assume that, at time t, the economy is populated by many identical young
agents and equally many identical old agents: population is constant. For simplicity,
both young and old own a production technology and consume what they produce.
This yeoman farmer assumption is a technical device which helps expose the salient
features of the model; however, we could equally develop the arguments by assuming
competitive goods and labor markets, and inelastic labor supply.
3.1 Equilibrium in the general model
A young agent has a unit time endowment which he may divide between goods pro-
duction and human capital accumulation. Letting c1t be goods consumption of the
representative young agent in time t, we write
c1t = f(nt) (1)
ht = g(1 − nt,Ht−1). (2)
Here n is the labor supplied by the agent towards good production, h is the attained
level of human capital, f is the young agent’s production function, which is assumed
primitive in that is takes only labor as a input, and g captures the production of
human capital. Finally, H is the aggregate level of human capital, which we allow
9to aﬀect human capital production: a more educated population produces educated
people more eﬃciently.3
An old agent also has a unit of time which he supplies inelastically to goods
production. Letting c2t be goods consumption of the representative agent who is old
in period t, we write
c2t+1 = F(ht,At+1) (3)
At+1 = G(At,zt+1,Ht,εt+1). (4)
Here F is the old agent’s more advanced production technology, which depends both
on his level of human capital accumulated when young, ht, as well as an agglomeration
eﬀect represented by At+1.4 Think of At+1 as capturing the eﬀectiveness of labor in
time t+1. We take At+1 to depend on the eﬀectiveness of labor in time t, exogenous
productivity shocks zt+1, the aggregate level of human capital Ht obtained by the
young in the previous period, and an additional exogenous shock εt+1 to be explained
below.
Young agents in time t receive utility, u, from consumption in periods t and
t + 1, as well as from the well-being of their progeny; they make time t decisions
about human capital investment to maximize expected value utility subject to the
constraints indicated above and conditional on available information. Let It be the
collection of all variables dated t − n for n ≥ 0. We assume that the information
3Implicit in our production formulation is that the young agent supply labor inelastically: no
value is place on leisure.
4In the Appendix, we allow the old agent to also access the primitive technology, and then
establish conditions suﬃcient to guarantee that he will not choose to do so.
10available to a young agent in time t is given by Ωt = {At,It−1}: notice that the young
agent does not observe Ht when making time t decisions, though in an equilibrium he
will be able to infer it. Let Vt(Ωt) be the value function for the representative young
agent at time t. Then Vt(Ωt) is obtained by choosing c1t,nt,ht, and a contingency
plan c2t+1 (Ωt+1) to maximize
(5) E (u(c1t,c2t+1,Vt+1 (Ωt+1))|Ωt)
subject to the constraints (1) – (3), and taking (4) as given.
Equilibrium in the model is obtained by exploiting the assumption that all agents
are identical, and identifying individual and aggregate human capital: Ht = ht. Thus
given exogenous processes zt and εt, and initial levels of aggregate human capital H0
and labor eﬀectiveness A0, an equilibrium is any collection of stochastic processes
{c1t,c2t,ht,nt,Ht,At} satisfying Ht = ht, constraints (1) – (4), and the representative
agent’s ﬁrst order conditions.
3.2 Equilibrium in the stylized model
The level of generality sustained in the previous subsection is useful for deﬁning the
modeling environment and understanding the broadest set of natural assumptions;
however, to make progress and obtain existence results, further assumptions are re-
quired. Because our goal is to examine issues of coordination failure in a model
of human capital investment desisions, we impose restrictions explicitly designed to
generate multiple equilibria, and abstract from other aspects of the model which
11are tangential to these issues. We will revisit the robustness of our results in the
conclusion.
Equilibrium indeterminacy is generated through increasing returns to labor eﬀec-
tiveness, and so we simplify other features of the model. The utility speciﬁcation is
modiﬁed to eliminate dependence on progeny, and to impose inter-temporal additiv-
ity and that instantaneous felicity is captured by the log form. The goods and human
capital production technologies of the young are now taken to be linear and indepen-
dent of lagged aggregate human capital. And, instead of assuming full rationality,
agent behavior is modeled using point expectations. These simpliﬁcations lead to the
following representative agent’s problem:
max logc1t + logc
e
2t+1
s.t c1t = nt







t+1 is the value of labor eﬀectiveness in time t + 1 expected by the young
agent in time t.
Because our focus is expectations formation and coordination, some discussion of
our modeling technique is warranted. We think of At+1 as capturing the uncertain
beneﬁt to human capital accumulation: the young know that their future consump-
tion, and therefore well-being, somehow depends on their education level h; however,
some aspects of this dependence are unknown: we model these unknown aspects by
assuming agents do not know the value of At+1 when making decisions; instead, they
12forecast the value of At+1 and make decisions based on this forecast. In a rational
equilibrium we require that their forecasts have no systematic errors.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume the behavior of the young agent is










In the Appendix, we examine with care the assumptions necessary to guarantee that
the young agent chooses h ∈ (0,1). Equation (6) implicitly deﬁnes the function
ht(Ae
t+1), which characterizes the young agent’s behavior in terms of expectations.
To deﬁne equilibrium, we simplify the transition dynamics of labor eﬀectiveness
by eliminated lagged dependence and productivity shocks:
(7) At+1 = Ht + εt+1,
where εt is a zero mean i.i.d. process with suﬃciently small support.5 As suggested
above, we think of εt as capturing the potentially stochastic (and hence uncertain)
eﬀect of aggregate human capital on labor productivity. Imposing our rationality
assumption yields Ae
t+1 = Ht. Thus we have the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 Given the process εt, a rational equilibrium of the stylized model is a
5The need for shocks with small support is discussed in the Appendix.







At+1 = Ht + εt+1.
Multiple equilibria obtain precisely when (8) has multiple solutions, and this pos-
sibility arises when F exhibits increasing social returns. To provide a laboratory for
analysis and to gain insight into the existence of multiple equilibria, we specify a func-
tional form for F. Our speciﬁcation is guided by the following desired characteristics:
1. Fh > 0: individual human capital is a productive input;
2. Fhh < 0: diminishing marginal returns to individual human capital;
3. FA > 0: aggregate human capital is a productive input;
4. FhA > 0: the marginal productivity of individual human capital is beneﬁted by
increased aggregate human capital.
To capture these characteristics in a ﬂexible function form, as well as to facilitate
analysis, we take F to be given by
(9) F(h,A) = Γ(A)(h − ¯ h)
α(A),
where Γ and α are suitably diﬀerentiable, non-negative functions, deﬁned on R+ (non-
negative reals), and ¯ h,α(A) ∈ (0,1). The scalar ¯ h captures the minimum education
necessary to access the advanced technology. A detailed analysis of the production
14function, as well as a proof that it has the requisite properties, is contained in the
Appendix.6
The function Γ captures the total factor productivity eﬀect of aggregate human
capital accumulation. Because of our log utility speciﬁcation, Γ plays no decision-
making role, see (6): it is used here to guarantee F has the properties listed above
while allowing us to separate level eﬀects from relative marginal eﬀects. On the other
hand, α plays a central role in our analysis. To interpret α, mentally set ¯ h = 0; then
the function α captures the output elasticity of individual human capital. We think
of α as increasing in A; thus a higher aggregate human capital stock increases the
responsiveness of output to individual education levels.
Combining the functional form (9) with the equilibrium condition (8) yields
(10) α(H) =
H − ¯ h
1 − H
,
where we have removed time-subscripts because of condition’s static nature. We
conclude that if H satisﬁes (10), then Ht = H, At+1 = H+εt+1 is rational equilibrium.
Multiple equilibria arise when (10) has multiple solutions: see Figure 1 below.
In Figure 1, we depict α as increasing, but with varying rate. This particular
shape for α may reﬂect a threshold eﬀect: for low values of aggregate human capital,
the elasticity is low and essentially constant, but as H crosses a threshold level, rep-
resenting, say, a certain percentage of the population having a high school education,
6Also, it is shown in the Appendix that the young will choose h > ¯ h so that F(h,A) is well-deﬁned.
15Figure 1: Multiple steady states
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the elasticity jumps sharply, before again leveling oﬀ.
3.3 Learning in the stylized model
The attainment of a given equilibrium in the stylized model presented in Section 3.2
(or in the general model of Section 3.1) requires the coordination of private agents’
expectations; yet the model is silent both on how this coordination is achieved and,
in case of multiple equilibria, which outcome prevails. To address these concerns, we
explicitly model expectations formation by taking our cue from the adaptive learning
literature: see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a general reference. This literature
dictates that we back away from the assumption that agents are omniscient, forward-
looking actors; instead, we model them as using simple forecasting rules to form
16expectations. The agents’ expectations then predicate their actions, which, in turn
generate new data; agents use these data to update their forecasting models and the
process repeats. In this way, the model is coupled with a learning dynamic which
may then be analyzed to assess transitions to equilibria as well as selection issues.
Importantly, expectations coordination is neither assumed nor required.
Development of a learning structure begins with the identiﬁcation of observables
and the speciﬁcation of the forecasting model. Recall that we view At+1 as capturing
the uncertain component of the returns to education; and the young are required
to forecast this component when making decisions. We take At to be known to
the young at time t: the young observe the returns of the old.7 Because rational
equilibria in our model are “noisy steady states” (they take the form At = H + εt),
the natural forecasting model is regression on a constant, that is, a simple average.






t + γt(At − A
e
t).
Here γt is the “gain” of the learning algorithm (11), and measures how seriously
agents take new data. If γt = 1
t then (11) reduces to the recursive least squares
estimator, which, in our case, is the sample mean; if γt = γ > 0 is a small constant,
7The value of At is not, in fact, the “returns of the old:” indeed, the marginal return of an addi-
tional unit of human capital investment in time t−1, that is, the marginal return of the old in time
t, is given by Fh(At,ht−1). We focus on forecasting At, and we interpret this forecasting behavior
as learning about returns to education, because At is the unique aggregate endogenous variable
aﬀecting the marginal returns to education. We could instead have assumed that agents explicitly
forecast the marginal return to education and condition their behavior accordingly; however, this
would complicate matters considerably, and we anticipate that because the relationship between Fh
and A is exogenous, the qualitative features of our results would be unaﬀected.
17then (11) is referred to as a “constant gain learning algorithm,” and represents geo-
metric discounting of past data. We interpret (11) as capturing the following mental
reasoning: young agents are endowed with society’s view (forecast) of the returns to
education (Ae
t) and, in addition, make their own individual observations (At); they
combine this information using (11) to obtain their forecasts (Ae
t+1), and then make
decisions based on these forecasts.
Given Ae
t+1, agent behavior is dictated by h(Ae










The assumption that all agents form expectations using the mechanism (11) implies
that Ht = h(Ae
t+1).9 Noting that
(12) At+1 = h(A
e
t+1) + εt+1,










Equation (13) determines the evolution of the economy and allows for the following
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2 Given the process εt and initial expectations Ae
0, a learning equilibrium
8A detailed analysis of agent behavior given arbitrary expectations Ae is provided in the Ap-
pendix.
9That all agents update their forecasts in the same manner is arguably a form of coordination;
the literature on eductive learning provides a mechanism allowing for this homogeneity assumption
to be relaxed: see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for further details.
18in the stylized model is a collection of sequences {Ht,At,Ae




The rich dynamic structure of the model’s learning equilibria allows a number of
diﬀerent issues to be addressed. First, and perhaps most urgently, what is the re-
lationship between rational equilibria and learning equilibria? If learning equilibria
bear no resemblance to rational equilibria then we are led to question the relevance of
this exercise; however if learning equilibria evolve to approximate rational equilibria
in some natural sense then we may view the learning mechanism as an equilibrium
selection device, providing justiﬁcation for the rational requirement of expectations
coordination. Second, and perhaps more ambitiously, the dynamic learning structure
provides a natural environment for simple policy experiments, thus allowing us to
analyze with some rigor which types of exogenous institutional actions might result
in welfare gains. We address these issues in turn.
4.1 Learning to be rational
The number and nature of the stylized model’s rational equilibria are determined as
solutions to (8), and are depicted graphically in Figure 1, whereas learning equilibria
are characterized by the dynamic system (13). Can we assess the relationship between
these creatures? The problem is an a-priori diﬃcult one: the rational equilibria are
straightforward to understand and analyze; but the learning equilibria are processes
19representing solutions to non-linear stochastic recursive algorithms (SRAs), and, gen-
erally speaking, SRAs are quite diﬃcult to understand. Fortunately, the forms of the
SRAs relevant for adaptive learning in economic models are amenable to asymptotic
and short sequence analysis using the theory of Ljung (1977): again, see Evans and
Honkapohja (2001) for applications to macroeconomics.
Our ﬁrst result provides the relationship between rational and learning equilibria
in case of decreasing gain.









t → H with probability one.
A formal statement of this result, together with its proof, are contained in the
Appendix.
Proposition 3 provides a simple stability condition which, when satisﬁed, imparts
the asymptotic equivalence of rational and learning equilibria: if the rational equi-
librium satisﬁes (14), if initial beliefs are within the rational equilibrium’s basin of
attraction, and if agents form expectations by simply averaging their initial beliefs
with realized data, then the learning equilibrium will converge in a natural sense to
the rational equilibrium. If the stability condition is satisﬁed, we say that the asso-
ciated rational equilibrium is stable. Somewhat remarkably, the stability condition
20(14) is directly related to the graphical depiction of rational equilibria:10 stability
obtains precisely when the graph of α crosses the upward-sloping curve from above.
Note that, in Figure 1, both the upper and lower rational equilibria are stable: in
each case, agents will learn to be rational.
For stable rational equilibria, the coordination problem is solved: agents are not
required for carefully and accurately forecast the behavior of other agents (which
would require forecasting the forecasts of other agents, etc); instead, they simply view
past data and compute the mean. Furthermore, Proposition 3 establishes equilibrium
stability as a selection mechanism in two distinct senses: ﬁrst, unstable rational
equilibria, such as the middle equilibrium depicted in Figure 1, should be discarded
– agents cannot learn to coordinate on them; and second, given two distinct stable
rational equilibria, selection by learning agents will depend on initial beliefs. As we
will see below, this beliefs’ dependency may be exploited by policy-makers to achieve
welfare improvement.
Our second result characterizes the ﬁnite horizon behavior in case of constant
gain. The result is more technical in nature, but is useful in that it allows for pre-
cise statements about transition dynamics and allows for a good approximation to
asymptotic behavior. In the Appendix it is show that a stable rational equilibrium H









0) be the solution to (15) corresponding to the initial condition Ae
0. The fol-
10This is remarkable because the graphical depiction of rational equilibria has no a-priori relation
to the learning model’s dynamics.
21lowing result provides a relationship between this solution and the associated learning
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Let H represent a stable rational equilibrium and let Ae
0 be initial
beliefs which are near H. Fix T, and let {Ae
t(Ae
0,γ)}T
t=0 be the ﬁnite-length time path
of beliefs associated to the constant gain γ and initial beliefs Ae
0, as determined by the
recursion (11). Then {Ae
t(Ae
0,γ)}T




t=0 and vanishing variance.
Again, a precise statement of the result, together with a formal proof is given in
the Appendix.11
Asymptotic results in case of constant gain are not available because of inde-
terminacy issues; however, this result is nearly as good. Intuitively, Proposition 4
states that for any time horizon T, the expected time path of beliefs will be well-
approximated by the solution to the diﬀerential equation (15), provided that the gain
is small enough; and, since this diﬀerential equation locally directs paths of beliefs
to a stable rational equilibrium, it follows that, locally, agents beliefs will get near
the rational equilibrium and stay near it for a long time. The implication of this
Proposition – and this is what we need for the paper – is that for small gain γ and
ﬁnite horizon T, the solution to the diﬀerential equation (15) provides a good approx-
imation to the expected time path of the recursive algorithm capturing the evolution
of households’ beliefs: so, instead of studying the recursive algorithm (which is hard),
we study the diﬀerential equation (which is easy).
11As the skeptical reader might have noticed, the formal statement requires scaling time so that
the continuous process ˜ Ae
t(Ae
0) and the discrete process Ae
t are comparable: see the Appendix for
details.
224.2 Implications and policy analysis
While the interaction between economic agents and policy-makers has not been for-
mally introduced in our model, the rich structure of learning dynamics allow us to
interpret exogenous changes in certain variables and parameters as directed by pol-
icy. We exploit this by exploring our model’s explanations of two stylized facts of
developing economies: the existence of poverty traps and the systematic errors made
by youth when forecasting the returns to education.
Propositions 3 and 4, together with Figure 1 provide a simple explanation of
poverty traps: agglomeration eﬀects impart equilibrium multiplicity, and the economy
is stuck in a rational equilibrium characterized by coordination failure. While this
story is well-understood, the novelty of our treatment is that now we know why agents
are stuck in the low human capital equilibrium: they were initially skeptical of the
value of education and their simple adaptive algorithm, together with the associated
forecast-based behaviors, reinforced and coordinated their skepticism.
The learning dynamics (13) suggests a mechanism through which policy-makers
might dislodge the economy and place it on a welfare improving path. Referring
again to Figure 1, suppose that Ae
t = HL. Then h(Ae
t) = HL and so, on average,
Ae
t+1 = HL: the economy is stuck near the low human capital rational equilibrium.
If, through advertising or public outreach, the government is able to inﬂuence the
beliefs of the youth, that is, if the policy makers can move Ae
t, then they may be able
to place the economy on a learning equilibrium time path that will converge to the
high human capital rational equilibrium.
As an example of this type of policy intervention, consider Figure 2. Here, we
23use the same speciﬁcation of α used to produce Figure 1. Figure 2 presents the
solutions to the diﬀerential equation (21) for varying initial conditions. Appealing to
Proposition 4, we know that these solutions approximate the expected time paths of
agents’ beliefs.















For low initial beliefs, the time paths converge to the low human capital ratio-
nal equilibrium: skepticism is reinforced and a poverty trap obtains. However, for
higher initial beliefs, the high human capital rational equilibrium is approached. As
suggested by this ﬁgure, policy induced shifts in beliefs may be welfare improving.
Turning to the presence of systematic bias in forecasts of returns to education, we
may examine the ﬁndings of Jensen (2010) that while observed returns to education
are quite high, perceptions of returns remain very low. Our model provides precisely
24the environment to explain this feature of the data. Note that for given beliefs Ae
t,
the value h(Ae
t) captures average realized returns. We have the following result:
Proposition 5 If Ae
t is in the basin of attraction of a stable rational equilibrium H,
and if Ae
t < H then h(Ae
t) > Ae
t.
This propostion follows immediately from the fact that α′(Ae) > 0 =⇒ h′(Ae).
Thus when perceptions of returns are low, our model predicts that realized returns
will be higher than perceptions.
A natural question remains: why would perceptions remain low for any extended
period of time? Our model’s explanation lies in the speciﬁcation and interpretation
of the gain parameter γt. This parameter measures the willingness of young agents to
modify their beliefs; and in this sense it can be viewed as measuring the strength of
the agents’ priors: small values of the gain imply that the agent has strong priors and
is thus unwilling to quickly alter his beliefs; large gain values imply weak conviction
and the willingness to let new data dictate forecasts.12
Alternatively, the gain parameter can be thought of as the conﬁdence agents have
in the information they receive. If, for example, information about the true returns
to education comes in the form of annecdotes about the experiences of relatives,
friends and acquaintances, the agent may be hesistant to put too much weight on
this information. In this sense the value of the gain parameter is a measure of the
perceived quality of the information itself.13
12These interpretations hold both for decreasing gain and constant gain: Proposition 3 holds if
γt = 1
t is replaced by γt = δ
t for any δ > 0.
13This interpretation of the gain parameter is admittedly looser than the “strength of priors”
interpretation provided just above: indeed, as modeled, the quality of the information received by
25We conclude that Jensen’s results are explained by either assuming agents have
strong priors, or that they don’t fully trust new information, and thus they choose
small values of the gain for the updating algorithm.
Figure 3: Average dynamics for diﬀerent gains























Our explanation of Jensen’s results also provides a policy prescription: policy-
makers should embrace actions directed toward weakening priors and increasing the
ﬂow and quality of information - thereby increasing the rate at which agents update
beliefs. Governmental strategies encouraging youth to take seriously the eﬀect of
human capital investment on productivity – i.e. place more weight on observed values
of returns to education – may speed up the transition to a high human capital rational
agents – the realization of past values of A – is perfect. One can imagine modiﬁcations to the model
which might better incorporate the notion of information quality: for example, agents might receive
a noisy (even biased) signal of A and rely on signal extraction to form their forecasts. While we have
not investigate alternatives, it is our intuition that our results would not be qualitatively altered.
26equilibrium, and therefore be welfare improving. To explore this possibility via our
example, we simulate constant gain learning. Figure 3 presents the average dynamics
across 100 simulations of the model for three diﬀerent values of the gain. Each
simulation was provided the same initial condition, which was chosen to be below
the high human capital rational equilibrium but within its basin of attraction. The
solid horizontal line at ≈ .577 identiﬁes the rational equilibrium HH. We see that, on
average, weaker priors, corresponding to higher gains, yield faster convergence.
5 Conclusion
If households have inaccurate perceptions about the true returns to education, and
these perceptions lead to underinvestment in human capital, then it becomes of critical
importance to understand the mechanisms through which learning about the true
returns takes place, and how this learning aﬀects economic growth. This paper
explored these issues in a dynamic model that explicitly incorporates learning. It is
found that multiple equilibria exist and that misperceptions about the true return to
education can lead to the economy becoming stuck in an equilibrium characterized
by low human capital investment. Critically, if young agents place low weight on
new information received about the true returns to education, they can substantially
underinvest in their own human capital.
By understanding the nature of the learning process, insights about eﬀective pol-
icy responses are gained. By actively seeking to get young agents to believe new
information about the true returns to education through programs designed to un-
dermine closely held predudices about educational investments and to increase the
27ﬂow and quality of information about the true returns to education, governments can
speed up the learning process and achieve faster and more robust growth.
286 Appendix
Here we justify the various assumptions made in the body of the paper, and provide
the technical proofs. To facilitate exposition, this appendix is organized into two
subsections: in the ﬁrst, we focus on modeling assumptions and agent behavior, and
we identify with greater care the associated rational equilibria; in the second we char-
acterize learning equilibria more formally and provide the proofs to the propositions.
6.1 The model under rationality
Set R+ = [0,∞). Let Γ : R+ → (0,∞) be diﬀerentiable and increasing. Let 0 < αL <
αH < 1 and let α : R+ → [αL,αH] be continuously diﬀerentiable and increasing. Let






Γ(Ae)(h − ¯ h)α(Ae) h ≥ ¯ h, Ae ≥ ¯ h
0 else
Here Γ(Ae) is a scalar which can be thought of as capturing total factor productivity,
and α is the potentially non-linear response of elasticity to the expected agglomeration
measure, which is assumed bounded between αL and αH. Finally, ¯ h is the minimum
education level needed to access the sophisticated technology F. Set
ˆ h =
αL + ¯ h
αL + 1
> ¯ h.




> −log(ˆ h − ¯ h)α
′(A
e).
We have the following result:
Lemma 6 There exists a scalable family of functions increasing diﬀerentiable Γ sat-
isfying (16). Further, if Γ satisﬁes (16), and if h ∈ (ˆ h,1) and Ae ≥ ¯ h then
1. Fh(h,Ae) > 0.
2. Fhh(h,Ae) < 0.
3. FAe(h,Ae) > 0.
4. FAeh(h,Ae) > 0.
Proof. Let δ > 0 and consider the diﬀerential equation
(17) Γ
′ = Γ  
  
   log(ˆ h − ¯ h)
 





This ode is separable, and so may be solved using standard techniques to obtain
Γ(A
e) = λe(|log(ˆ h−¯ h)|α(Ae)+δAe),
where λ is any positive scalar. Now simply notice that any solution to (17) also
satisﬁes (16).
30Showing that F satisﬁes items (1) and (2) is trivial. To see that F also satisﬁes
(3) and (4), notice that
FAe(h,A























e)(h − ¯ h)
α(Ae)−1Γ(A
e).






e)log(h − ¯ h) > 0,
which is equivalent to (16).
We conclude that provided we restrict attention to h ∈ (ˆ h,1) and Ae ≥ ¯ h, F satisﬁes
the desired properties.
Now that the production function has been deﬁned with care, we turn to agent
behavior and model equilibrium. For completeness and consistency, we assume that
besides having access to the technology F, old agents may also use the same primitive
technology they used when young. We make the additional assumption that using F
is a full-time job: if the old agent directs any labor to the primitive technology, then
he relinquishes access to the advanced technology. Since we assume that the agent
must base all of his decisions on expectations (i.e. he must decide whether to use
the advanced technology before knowing the value of A) we know that if the agent
plans to use the primitive technology in the second period, he will necessarily choose
h = 0. Therefore, since F(0,Ae) = 0, we may model agent behavior as follows:











e) + δ(1 − h).
As this formulation of the agent’s problem makes clear, his choice of education, h,
depends on his expectations Ae. Notice that since the marginal utility of consumption
goes to inﬁnity as consumption goes to zero, it follows that we can rule out the corner
solution h = 1. We exogenously impose that Ae ≥ 0. There are two cases:
Case 1: Ae < ¯ h. If Ae < ¯ h then for any h, we have that F(h,Ae) = 0. It follows
that agent the representative agent sets h = 0.
Case 2: Ae ≥ ¯ h. Now the agent has two choices. Either he can set h = 0, and
thus receive total utility equal to zero, or the agent can choose some h > ¯ h. Since we
already know that h < 1, it follows that if h > ¯ h then h will be chosen to satisfy the
interior FOC given by
(18) h(A
e) =
α(Ae) + ¯ h
α(Ae) + 1
∈ (ˆ h,1).
32We conclude that the representative agent chooses h = h(Ae) if and only if Ae ≥ ¯ h
and the utility received by choosing h = h(Ae) is greater than zero. But




e) − ¯ h) ⇐
0 < log
 
1 − ¯ h
1 + αH
 
+ Γ(¯ h) + αL log
 




where the implication uses the fact that α ∈ [αL,αH] and Γ′ > 0. Since Γ is scalable,
we may assume that (19) holds. Thus, we assume here, and in the text, that if Ae ≥ ¯ h
then h = h(Ae) as given by (18). We summarize these results in the following Lemma:








α(Ae)+1 Ae ≥ ¯ h
0 else
In the text we focused exclusively on the case Ae ≥ ¯ h. Note that if Ae ≥ ¯ h
then h(Ae) ≥ ˆ h; thus, whenever the representative agent is accessing the advanced
technology, the associated production function has the desired properties as listed in
Lemma 6.
Now recall the following deﬁnition: a rational equilibrium is any collection of
processes {At,Ae
t,Ht} so that










t + εt Ae
t ≥ ¯ h
0 else
where our deﬁnition of At has been modiﬁed to allow for Ht = 0. Also, to
guarantee that At ≥ 0, we assume that εt has small support: εt ∈ (−ε,ε) where
0 < ε < ¯ h.
Note ﬁrst that Ht = 0 identiﬁes an “autarky” rational equilibrium: if an agent
expects that no one is accumulating human capital then his best response is also to
forgo education and simply adopt the primitive technology in both periods. In the
text, we focused on equilibria of the form Ht = Hss where Hss = h(Hss). Notice that,
in this case, Ae = Hss ≥ ¯ h so that agent behavior is captured by their interior FOC,
and h = Hss ≥ ˆ h: thus the production function has the desired properties.
6.2 Learning equilibria
In the text, we identiﬁed learning equilibria with time paths of expectations generated
by a simple recursive algorithm capturing the weighted average of past observations.
As is standard in the learning literature, asymptotic results yielding almost sure con-
vergence require that the learning algorithm be modiﬁed to incorporate a projection
facility. To develop the appropriate notions, recall that a learning equilibrium is










34To study the asymptotic behavior of (20), we appeal to Ljung’s theory, as developed
in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). The idea is to approximate the mean time path of
Ae
t with the solution to a diﬀerential equation. To this end, let
g(A
e) = E (h(A
e) − A
e + εt) = h(A
e) − A
e,
and notice that g is continuously diﬀerentiable on (ˆ h,1). Ljung’s theory provides






oﬀers locally a good approximation to the expected behavior of the stochastic process
Ae
t. To make this statement precise, let Hss identify a rational equilibria, and notice
that Hss represents a rest point of the ode (21): g(Hss) = 0. Assume that g′(Hss) < 1,
that is, Hss is a Lyapunov-stable rest point of (21). Then there exists an open set D
containing Hss and a twice continuously diﬀerentiable Lyapunov function f : D → R+
so that, among other properties, f(Hss) = 0 and whenever Hss  = Ae ∈ D it follows
that f(Ae) > 0 and g(Ae)  = 0.
The function f identiﬁes the local nature of the approximation, and tells us how
to construct the appropriate projection facility: for c > 0, denote by S(c) the lower
contour set for f:
S(c) = {A
e ∈ D : f(A
e) ≤ c}.
Notice that there exists c so that c′ ≤ c implies that S(c′) is compact and int(S(c′))  =
∅. Because α is continuously diﬀerentiable, it follows that h is continuously diﬀeren-
35tiable, and so locally Lipschitz, which is a property necessary for our stability result.
Therefore, we may choose c > 0 so that h is Lipschitz on S(c). Fix 0 < c2 < c1 < c,










t + εt) Ae
t + γt(h(Ae
t) − Ae
t + εt) ∈ S(c1)
ˆ A ∈ S(c2) else
The modiﬁed learning algorithm (22) incorporates the projection facility: any time
agents’ expectations deviate too sharply from rationality – that is, fall outside the
set S(c1) – they are placed back to an arbitrary point within the set S(c2). The
employment of a projection facility is standard in the learning literature – see Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) for discussion and details – and is necessary to obtain almost
sure convergence: it is always possible that an unusual sequences of shocks will push
expectations so far away from the steady state that return is not possible. On the
other hand, the learning algorithm can be further modiﬁed so that the probability that
the projection facility is used – that is, the probability that Ae
t+γt(h(Ae
t)−Ae
t) / ∈ S(c1)
– is arbitrarily small. We are now ready to state our result:
Proposition 8 Assume
 
γt = ∞ and
 
γ2
t < ∞. Suppose Hss is a Lyapunov








t converges to Hss almost surely.
Given our construction of the algorithm (22), and the assumptions imposed on
36α, the proof of this proposition now follows immediately from Corollary 6.8, on page
136 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
Proposition 8 addresses the decreasing gain case: γt → 0. Now we analyze the










where γ > 0 is small. Since Ae
t = G(Ae
t−1) + γεt for appropriate G, it follows that Ae
t
will never “settle down,” that is, converge to a degenerate random variable. However,
results from Benveniste et al (1990) provide for short sample analysis. In particular,
the results provide the precise sense in which the solution to the ode (21) approximates
the expectated time path of Ae
t. To compare solutions to (21) with realizations of the
stochastic process Ae
t, two adjustments must be made: Ae
t must be deﬁned for all real
t, not just for integer values of t; and the time-scale for Ae
t must be adjusted. To this
end, let Ae
n(Ae











0) whenever γn ≤ t ≤ γ(n + 1).
So ˆ Ae
t(γ,Ae
0) is a step function with heights deﬁned by Ae
n and with bins of width γ
identifying the adjusted time scale.
Now let ˜ Ae
t(Ae
0) be the solution to the ode (21) corresponding to the initial con-
dition Ae
0. Let S(c) as above, with ˜ Ae
t(Ae
0) ∈ S(c) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. Finally, assume α
is twice continuously diﬀerentiable. We have the following result:
Proposition 9 There is a continuous time stochastic process yt with y(0) = 0 so that














converges weakly to yt for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. Furthermore, Eyt = 0.14
This proposition follows immediately from our assumptions on α and from Propo-
sition 7.8, Evans and Honkapohja (2001) page 163. Intuitively, we conclude that
for small γ and ﬁnite horizons, the solution to the ode (21) well-approximates the
expected behavior of the process Ae
t, provided that the time scale is appropriately
adjusted.
14The process yt is determined as the solution to the stochastic diﬀerential equation
dy(t) = h′( ˜ Ae
t(Ae
0))y(t)dt + σεdw(t),
where w(t) is a standard Wiener process.
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